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fully justify the act to the jury on the ground of a defect of law
and justice, it is time that something were done to remedy such
a palpable evil, and to end this line of ghastly precedents.
Tnor, June, 1868.
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Any object in, upon, or near the travelled path of a highway which would
necessarilty obstruct or hinder one in the use of the way for the purpose of travelling thereon, or which from its nature and position'would be likely to produce that
effect, will, as a general rule, constitute a defect in the highway.
But those objects.which have no necessary connection with the road-bed or
relation to the public travel thereon, and the danger from which arises from mere
casual proximity and not from the use of the road for the purpose of travelling
thereon, will not, as a general rule, render the road defective.
Where a nag was suspended by private individuals across a public street of a
city, with. i on-weights at the lower corners which were liable tor become detached
by the motion of the flag in the wind and to fall upon persons passing below, ana
one of the weights became detached in this manner and fell upon and injured a
traveller on the higuway who was in the exercise of reasonable care, it was held,
that the city was noiliable for the injury under the duty imposed upon it by law
to keep the street 11in good and sufficient repair."'
An allegation of duty without stating the facts which raise the duty, is insuffl.
cient ; and if the facts stated uo not raise the duty alleged, the allegation of duty
is immaterial.

ACTION on the statute, 41 concerning highways and bridges,"which gives a right of -action for injuries received by means of
any defective bridge or road against the town or other corporation which ought, to keep the same in repair;. brought by the
plaintiff as administratrix of James Hewisonr deceased, in the
Superior Court in Fairfield county.
The declaration was as follows: "That on the 1st day of No.
vember 1864, a certain street and highway in said city of *New
Haven,'and running through said city, known as Chapel stree't,
which it was the duty of the defendants, under and by force of
their said act of incorporation, to keep in good. and sufficient
repair and free from nuisances and obstructions which would
endanger the safety of persons travelling thereon, at a place in
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said city a little northerly of the intersection of said street with
Church street, so called, was, through the neglect of the defendants, insufficient, defective, and dangerous to persons travelling
over and along the same, by reason of a large piece of cloth being
suspended perpendicularly over and across the same about twelve
feet above the level of said street, and attached to buildings on
each side of said street, by persons unknown to the plaintiff, with
heavy iron weights attached to the same in such manner and so
insecurely that the said weights were liable to fall, or by force
of the wind operating upon said piece of cloth, to be projected
with great force upon and against persons travelling along said
street. And the -plaintiff says that on the day and year last
aforesaid the said James Hewiso'n was passing along said street,
at or near the portion of the same across and over which said
piece of cloth was suspended as aforesaid, and then and .there one
of said iron weights so attached to the said piece of cloth as
aforesaid, was, by force of the wind blowifig the said piece of
cloth, and by reason of being so insecurely attached to the same
as aforesaid, thrown and- projected against the said James Hewison, striking him upon his head and breaking his skull, whereby
the said James was subjected to great pain and suffering, and in
consequence whereof he afterwards, to wit, on the day and year
last aforesaid, died; whereby and by force of said statute.the
defendants beeame and are liable to pay to the plaintiff, as adminigratrix as aforesa*id, the damages which the said James
Hewison sustained as aforesaid, which she says are ten thousand
dollars; for the recovery of which said damages an action has
accrued to the plaintiff, as administratrix as aforesaid, the defendants never having paid the same, though, often requested and
demanded; which is to the damage of the plaintiff, as such administratrix, the sum of ten thousand dollars, for the recovery
of which, with costs, this suit is brought."
The defendants demurred to this declaration, and the case was
reserved, on the demurrer, for the advice of this court.
C. B. Ingersoll and Tratrous, in support of the demurrer,
cited O7idsey v. Canton, 17 Conn. 475; Borough of Stonington
v. States, 31 Id. 213; Vinal v. Dorchester, 7 Gray 421; Hixon
v. City of Lowell, 18 Id. 59; Keith v. Easton, 2 Allen 552:
Barber v. City of Boxbury, 11 Id. 818; Ray v. City of Man.
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ehester, Am. Law Reg. Feb. 1867, 250; Kidder v. Dunstable,
7 Gray 104; Shepherd v. Chelsea, 4 Allen 118.
Beardsley, contra, cited House v. Metcalf, 27 Conn. 632;
Dimock v. Town of Suffield, 30 Id. 129; Drake v. Lowell, 18
Met. 292; Bigelow v. _andolph, 14 Gray 543.
CARPENTER, J.-The law is well settled that an allegation of
duty without stating the facts which raise the duty is insufficient.
It is equally true that if the facts stated do not raise the duty
alleged, the allegation of duty is immaterial: Priestlyv. Fowler,
8 Mees. & Wels. 1 ; Seymour v. Maddox, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. R.
265 ; Jlayden v. Smithville Manufacturiny Company, 29 Conn.
548.
In this case the duty alleged has reference solely to "the
removal of the obstruction or nuisance which caused the injury;
and the character and situation of the nuisance are particularly
described in the declaration. This duty is further limited in the
declaration, as arising from the general statute concerning highways and bridges. The declaration contains but one count, and
that is founded upon the statute. We 'have no occasion therefore
to inquire whether the city charter imposes upon the defendant.
the duty contended for by the plaintiff. If -the statute in question imposes no such duty, it is manifest that the declaration ia
insufficient.
The 1st section, page 492, makes it the duty of towns to
"make, build, and keep in good and sufficient repair, all the
necessary highways and bridges within the limits of such towns.'"
The 6th section -i designed to enforce this duty, and is as follows: "1If any person shall lose a limb, break'a bone, or receive
any bruise or bodily injury, by means of any defective bridge
or road, the town, person, persons, or corporation, which ought to
keep such road or bridge in repair, shall pay to the person so
hurt, or wounded, just damages."
The duty of keeping this highway in repair, prior to 1862,
rested upon the town of New Haven; hut the legislature -of that
year transferred this duty, and consequently the liability, from
the town to the city. The duty of the city-since that time in no
respect differs from the duty of the town before. The statute
must have the same construction, whether applicable to a town oz
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city; so that the broad question is here presented, whether' an
object suspended over the highway entirely out of the way of
travellers, yet dangerous to them by reason of its being insecurely
fastened, renders such way defective. This precise question was
involved in the discussion of the case of Jones v. -The City of
New Haven, 34 Conn. 1, but a decision of it being unnecessary
to a disposition of that case, it was left undetermined. In that
case it was not seriously contended that no duty rested upon the
defendant in respect to the matter which caused the injury; but
it was strenuously urged that, inasmuch as the duty was a corpo.
rate one for public purposes, the defendant was not liablefor a
breach of the duty, unless expressly made so by statute. The
principal question there was whether liability attached to a breach
of duty. We held that it did. The question here is whether any
duty rested upon the defendant. There is a further distinction
between that case and this, in respect to the liability, if it be,
conceded in this case that the defendbnt has been guilty of any
breach of duty. In that case we held the defendant liable, not
under .he general statute upon which this suit is brought, and
which imposes duties upon towns without their consent, but under
the city charter, by accepting which the defendant, for a consideration, voluntarily entered into a contract with the public to
discharge the duty in question. This distinction is' an important
one, as will be seen by a reference to the opinion in that case.
But the question now before the court is one of duty, and not of
liability for a breach of duty.
The decision of this case must obviously: depend upon the con.
struction to be given to the statute upon which it is brought.
It must be borne in mind that, while every defect in a high.
way which obstructs, hinders, or endangers travellers thereon is
a nuisance, yet it is not every nuisance which obstructs, hinders,
or endangers travellers upon a highway that constitutes a defect
of the highway within the meaning of this act. In ifixon v. City
of Lowell, 18 Gray 69, the court say: "The traveller may be
subjected to inconvenience and hazard from various sources, none
of which would constitute a ' defect or want of repair' in the way
for which the town would be responsible. He might be annoyed
by the action of the elements ; by a hail-storm, by a drenching
rain, by piercing sleet, by a cutting and icy wind, against which,
however long continued, a town would be under no obligation to
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furnish him protection. He might be obstructed by a concourse
of people, by a crowd of carriages; his horses might be frightened
by the discharge of guns, the explosion. of fire.works, by military
music, by the presence of wild animals; his health might be endangere d by pestilential vapors, or by the contagion of disease;
and these sources of discomfort and danger might be found within
the limits of the highway, and continue for more than twenty-four
hours, and yet that highway not be, in any legal sense, defective
or out of repair. It is obvious that there may be nuisances upon
travelled ways for which there is no remedy against the town
which is bound by law to construct and maintain the way. If
the owner of a distillery, for example, or of a manufactory adjoining the street of a city, should discharge continuously from a
pipe or orifice opening towarI the street a'quantity of steam or
hot water, to the nuisance and injury'of passers-by, they must
certainly seek redress in some other mode than by an action for a
defective way. If the walls of a house adjoining a sireet in a
city were erected in so insecure a manner as to be liable to fall
upon persons passing by, or if the eaves-trough or water conductor was so arranged'as to throw a stream from the roof upon
the side-walk, there being in either case no stiucture erected
within or above the travelled way, it -would not constitute a defect
in the way."
A water-wheel niay be a nuisance that will render the owner
liable civilly to a persons who sustain an injury thereby: House
v. etcf, 27 Conn. 631. So also spiing-guns, set outside the
limits of the highway,'which endanger passers by, are a nuisance,
and the person setting them may-be indicted, and would be liable
to an action at the suit of a party injured: State v.- Moore, 31
Conn. 479. Other instances might be given,.but it i6 unnecessary. In any of these cases it would be a novel doctrine to hold
that a highway surveyor would have a right, by virtue of his
office, to interfere and abate or remove the nuisance.
But other nuisances exist concerning whicl there is more doubt,
and to them we will now turn our attention.
The plaintiff claims that it was the duty of the city to keep. the
highway free from nuisances, either-upon or over it, which would
render it unsafe or inconvenient for public travel. The defendant
claims that a road can only be rendered defective by something
in or upon.the road-bed itself. We think .the plaintiff's claim is
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too broad. We are not prepared to- establish the doctrine That
everything which renders the highway unsafe makes it defective
within the meaning of this act. Such a construction would impose heavy and unnecessary'burdens upon towns. It would in
effect make them insurers, for the time being, of the safety of
travellers upon the highway; a liability to which the legislature
never intended to subject them. If they had'so intended, it must
be presumed that they would have expresse d such intention in
clear and unmistakeable language. They have not only failed to
do this, but the language used, taken in connection with other
parts of the statute, shows that such was not their intention.
It seems to have been a matter of doubt whether a bridge, or
a part of the highway raised above the adjoining ground, although
dangerous, was defective ; and hence a railing was expressly
required at such places for the purpose of protecting the "'safety
of travellers."
Here then was one danger specially provided for. The legislature must have been aware that other dangers existed, or might
exist,.and yet* they made no provision for them. What is the
inference ? Not only that they did not suppose that the language
used was broad enough to embrace every possible danger, but
also that they did not intend to make towns liable iu cases not
expressly provided for. We ought not therefore to extend this
statute by construction: Chidsey v. Canton, 17 Conn. 475.
Oi the other hand, we think the construction contended for by
the defendant is too limited. To construe the word "defective"
as applying to the road-bed only, would partially defeat the purpose which the legislature had in view; for it is obvious that there
may be objects off the road-bed, yet so near it, either on one side
or over it, as seriously to impede the public travel. That it was
intended to make it the duty of towns to keep the highway clear
of such obstructions seems hardly to admit of a doubt.
To define in general terms the precise limits of the duty of
towns in-these cases is not an easy matter, as each case must
depend very much upon its own peculiar circumstances. The
following, however, may be an approximation to it. Any object
in, upon, or near the travelled path, which would necessarily
obstruct or hinder one in the use of the road for the purpose of
travelling thereon, or which, from its nature and position, would
be likely to produce that result, would generally constitute a
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defCct in the highway. For example, branches of a tree banging
over the road-bed near the ground necessarily obstruct the use of
the way, and should be removed by the town; and any object
upon or near the travelled path, which, in its nature, is calculated
to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness, being likely to obstruct
the use of the way, may constitute a defect in the way itself. In
these cases the use of the way necessarily co-operates with the
nuisance in producing the injury ; neither the use of the way, nor
the nuisance will of itself have that effect. If the two combined
will necessarily or probably result in harm, it seems fair to presume that it was the intention of the legislature to make the town
responsible for the removal of such a nuisance.
On the other hand, those objects which have .no necessary connection with the road-bed, or the public travel thereon, and which
may expose a person to danger, not as a traveller, but independent
of the highway, do not ordinarily render the road defective- For
example, tree' 6r walls of a building standing beside the road,
and liable to fall by reason of age and aecay, or from other cause;
or any object suspended over the highway so high as to be entirely out of the way of travellers ; these, and like objects, may
be more or'less dangerous; but they do not obstruct travel. A
person may be injured by them, but the use of the way, as such,
does not necessarily conduce to the injury; he will be quite as
likely to be injured while standing on the way, as while in motion ; quite as likely to be injured while off the way as while, on
it. The tree or other object may or may not fall; it may or may
not fall upon the highway; if it aoqs, it may or may not fall upon
a person travelling thereon; such a coincidence may possibly
occur; but'it is certainly not to be expected as a probable event.
Such objects may be nuisances, which ought to, be removed; but
the act in question has not- imposed that duty'upon towns. The
cause of injury in this case belongs to the' latter class of
nuisances ; and the injury itself seems to have been the result of
accident, rather than of any breach of duty on the part of the
city.
An examination of a"few of the cases cited in the argu., ept
will confirm the views above expres sed. 'In Chidse. v.' Canton,
17 Conn. 475, the plaintiff's wife and daughter were injured by
the neglect of the town, in consequence of which he had lost
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their services and had incurred expense in-nursing and caring'for
them. The action was brought to recover the damages thus sustained. It was decided that he could not 'recover, the court
refusing to extend the operation of the statute beyond the plain
import of the words used.
In the case of -Dimoek v. Town of Suffield, it was held that a
nuisance outside of the travelled path might constitute a defect
in the highway ; but.that to make the town liable for neglect to
remove such an object the case should be a very clear one.
In Massachusetts they have a statute, much more comprehensive
than ours. It provides that "all highways shall be kept in repair,
so that the same may be safe and convenient for travellers, at all
seasons of the year." And again: the surveyor of highways
has power "to remove all gates, bars, enclosures, or other things
that shall in any manner obstruct or encumber, any highway, or
incommode or endanger persons travelling thereon."
Under this statute the court held, in .Drake v. Lowell, 13 Met.
292, that it was the duty of the city to remove a defective awning
projecting over the sidewalk from an adjoining building. But in
Hixon v. Lowell, 13 Gray 59, the court refused to extend the
operation of the principles of that decision to a case where the
only defect in the highway was the projection, from the roof of a
building, of a mass of snow and ice which had gradually collected
upon it, and had slid and been pressed forward by the snow above
it, ufitil it overhung the travelled way, and rendered passing beneath it dangerous. In the latter case the court say: "In most
cases the town has discharged its duty when it has made the surface of the ground, over which the traveller passes, sufficiently
smooth, level and guarded by railings, to enable him to travel
with safety and convenience by. the exercise of ordinary care on
his own part. There may be many causes of injury to which he
might be exposed in travelling upon such-a way, ivhich would not
constitute any defect or want of repair in the way itself. The
town, if. it has done its duty in making the way safe and convenient in all the proper attributes of a way, is not obliged to
insure the safety of those who use it." Again: "The liability
of towns for injuries caused by defective ways is created by
statute; and is not to be extended by construction beyond the
limits which a reasonable interpretation of the statute establishes."
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We think these principles are sound and applicable to this case.
The plaintiff's declaration is insufficient.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The foregoing ease, although somewhat at variance, perhaps, with some
of the earlier American cases on the
subject of the extent of the responsibility of towns for defects within the
limits of the laid-out highway, but not
upon the travelled path, seems to conform to the more recent decisions bearing upon the question. Indeed it may
be fairly said, we think, that the courts
have found juries so ready to divide
losses'ocaurring upon highways among
th inhabitants of the municipality,
without much reference, often, to the
precise cause of such losses, that there
seemed to be a tnind of necessity to interpose 'the most stringent rules of law
in ordei to protect such municipalities
from unjust claims.
And some of the efforts in this direction seem to fismore nice than wise.
Thus, in Palmer v. Andover, 2 Cush.
600, the general rule that towns are
responsible for damage resulting from
the combined causes of inevitable accident and the defect of the highway,
withont which it would not have occurred, is fully recognised, as in many
earlier cases; Hunt v. Pownal, 9 Vt.
R. 411, and others adopting the same
view. But in Davis v. Dudley, 4 Allen
557, it seems to be considered that a
town is not responsible in damages if a
horse being frightened, by acedent,
breaks ayay from his driver and escapes
from all control, and afterwards, while
running at large, meets with an injury
throug a defect in a kighway. It would
seem, with reference to the two causes
here alleged as the combined causes, and
only alleged causes of the damage, as
if the case must come within the principle of the other cases just quoted. But
the argument in the opinion in this case
rests mainly upon the point that the
VOL. XVI.-50

plaintiff could not have been in the
exercise of ordinary care at the very
moment the damage occurred. And if
this is to be regarded as the ground
of decision, the cases may be held consistent with each other. But in that
view, the head-note does not give the
true point of decision, as Lord CAMtPBELL was fond of saying, the ratio
decidendi. And the learned judge here
recognises that the opinion he was delivering seemed at variance with the
reasoning of the same court, at an earlier day; upon a somewhat similar case,,
Howard v. North Brdqewater 16 Pick.
189. We should prefer giving the later
case a construction consistent with the
general rule in other cases, that where
the injury is the combined result of pure
accident and the defect in the highway,
the municipality is responsible. But there
are some cases, in other states, which
will hot admit of any such construction,
and really seem.to hold that the injury,
to be a good cause of action, must result
exclusively from the defect in the highway, which we believe seldom occurs :
Moore v. Abbott, 32 Me. R. 46; Jfoulton v. Sandford, 57 Id. 127, Chief Justice APPLrTom dissenting. It is tindoubtedly true that if the primary cause
of the injury was some defect in the
plaintiff's apparfitus for travelling, or
anything else for which he is responsible, and which he might have guarded
against by the exercise of the proper
degree of care and watchfulness, he
cannot recover, because be was himself
in fault in regard to a matter directly
contributing to the loss7: Rowell v.,fo, ;
ell, 7 Gray 101. But where the. plaintiff is not in fault and the damage occurred from pure accident and the defect
of the highway, the true rule unquestionably is, that the town is responsible.

CASE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY.
But defects in highways, to be any
ground of action for injuries occurring
in consequence, must be some obstruction to the passage of the traveller, and
ordinarily this obstruction must be within
the travelled portion of the highway.
Thus, in Keith v. Easton, 2 Allen 552,
it was held the town was not responsible
for damage accruing to the plaintiff by
his horse being frightendd by a daguerrian saloon allowed to remain partly
within the limits of the highway, but
several feet outside of the travelled path.
And in Barber v. Roxbury; I1 Allen
318, it was held that a rope stretched
across the highway and in temporary
use, is not a defect or want of repair in

the-highway for which a city is liable to
a traveller who receives an injury from
coming into collision with it while it is
in motion from human agency. And in
Kingsbury v. Dellom, 13 Allen 186, it
was held, after elaborate examination
and consideration, that an object in the
highway, with which tie traveller does
not come in collision or contact, and
which is not shown to be an actual obstruction in the way of travel, is not to
be deemed a defect in the highway, for
the reason that it is of a nature to cause
a horse to take fright, which occurred

in the present case, whereby serious
damage occurred.
I. F. R.

-DistrictCourt of the United States, Eastern .Districtof
Pennsylvania.
CASE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE UNITED STATES.
The term for which the incumbent of an office, whose duration was limited by
law, had been appointed by the President with the concurrence of the Senate,
expired when the Senate was in session. No appointment in which the Senate
concurred was made at that session, and the President, in the ensuing recess,
appointed another person to the office by a commission to expire at the end of the
next session of the Senate.
It seems that the former incumbent's term was notextended by the Tenure of
Office Act of 2d March 1867 ; and that as he had beeh appointed before that act,
Congress could not constitutionally have prolonged by it his official tenure, without a new appointment by the President, and concurrence of ihe Senate, as to the
additional period.
It seems also that the commission of the subsequent appointee was of no effect,
the vacancy not having happened during a recess of the Senatei and the President,
therefore, having no constitutional power to make a temporary appointment.
PROCEEDINGS upon the question of incumbency of the office of
Attorney for the United States in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
The question depended principally upon the effect of two
clauses of the Constitution. One of them provides that the President shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, shall appoint all officers whose appointments are
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not otherwise provided for in the Constitution, and which shall be
established by law. The other clause provides that the President
shall have power to fill up all vacancies .that may happen during
the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall
expire at the end of their next session.
The 1st section of the Act of Congress of the 2d of March
1867, known as the Tenure of Office Act, is in the words"Every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and.
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and eveiy person who shall hereafter
be appointed to any such office and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is,
and shall be, entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like
manner appointed and duly qualified, except as hercrn otherwise provided."

The provision of the section which follaws applies only to the
heads of the executive departments of th,. government. The 2d
section authorizes the President, during the Senate's recess,
to suspend for reasons and upon evidence to be reported by him
to the Senate, within twenty days after the commencement of
their next session, all officers except judges of the courts of the
United States ; and to designate a suitable person to perform,
temporarily, the duties of any such officer until the Senate's next
meeting, and their action upon the case ; but does not authorize
the removal of the former incumbent, unless the Senate concur
in the suspension and removal. The 3d section enacts"That the President-shall have power to fill all vacancies which may happen
during the recess of the Senate, by reason of death or resignation, by granting cqmmissions which shall expire at the end of their next session thereafter And if no
appointment by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall be made to
such office so vacant or temporarily filled -as aforesaid, during such- next session
of the Senate, such office shall remain in abeyance without any salary, fees,"or
emoluments attached thereto until the same shall be filled by appointment thereto
by and with.the advice and consent of the Senate; and, during such time, all tlf&
powers and duties belonging to such office shall be exercised by such other officer
as may by law exercisa such powers and duties in case of a vacancy in such office."

The words of the 4th section are"That nothing in this act contained shall be construed -to extend the term of any
office, the duration of which is limited by law."

The Qffice of attoriney for the United States was established ipi
every judicial district by'the Judiciary Act of 24th September
1789. By the Act of 15th May 1820, the duration of the term
of the office was limited to four years. By an Act of 2d August
1861 the attorney-general was charged with the general superin-
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tendence and direction of the attorneys and marshals of all the
districts, as to the manner of discharging their respective duties;
and they were required to report to him an account of their
official proceedings, &c., as he might direct. By the same act
the attorney-general was empowered, whenever in his opinion the
public interest might require it, to employ and retain, in the
name of the United States, such attorneys and counsellors at law
as he might think necessary to assist the district attorneys in the
discharge of their duties.
Before the Tenure of Office Act Charles Gilpin, Esq., was,
during a session of the Senate, appointed to the office of attorney
for the United States in this district by the President, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of four years, which
expired when the Senate was in session, on 15th March 1868.
For more than five months after this expiration of Mr. Gilpin's
term he acted constantly, in and out of court, as the incumbent'
of the office, and was constantly recognised-as such incumbent in
correspondence and in other modes by the attorney-general and
the officers of other executive departments of the government.
On 20th April 1868, however, the President, during the same
session in which Mr. Gilpin's term of office expired, had nominated John P. O'Neill, Esq., to the office. On 27th July 1868
the Senate adjourned without having acted upon this nomination.
, This adjournment was under a joint resolution, of 22d July,
that the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of
Representatives should, on the 27th of that month, at noon', adjourn
their respective Houses until 21st September, and on that day,
unless it should be then otherwise ordered by the two Houses,
should further adjourn their respective Houses until the first Mon
day of December.
On Saturday, 22d August 1868, the President appointed Mr.
O'Neill to the office by a commission to expire at the end of the
next session of the Senate. On Monday, 24th August 1868, Mr.
O'Neill saw the judge at chambers. He was desirous that the
judge should administer the oath of office to him, and that it
should be filed in the clerk's Office of this court. Mr. Gilpin was
not present, the state of his health not admitting of his absence
from his own house. But he sent a message that he did not
recognise any right in Mr. O'Neill to the office.
The judge said that he would not then administer the oath to
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Mr. O'Neill, or permit the filing of it in the clerk's office, because
to do so might seem to prejudge the question of incumbency, and
might perhaps have a tendency to make'Mr. O'Neill the apparent
incumbent of the office in fact whether he were such of right or
not. The judge suggested that the oath could be as well taken
before any other magistrate qualified to administer it, and that it
might, with equal effect, be filed in the office of the law department, at Washington. It was accordingly filed there, having
been taken before a commissioner.
The court was in session from 1st to 24th September. Mr.
O'Neill was not in court; and the husiuess of the United States
in court was transacted by Mr. Gilpin, or by Mr. Valentine, who
had been previously retained by the attorney-general to assist in
the discharge of the duties of the office.
On Saturday, 19th September, Mr. Gilpin received from 'the
attorney-gen6ral, a written direction, dated on the 18th, to transfer
the business of the office to Mr. O'Neill.
The only proceedings of Congress on the 21st September, conssted in an adjournment .nder a joint resolution that the President of the Benate and Speaker of the House of Representatives
adjourn their respective Houses until noon on 16th October 1868,
and that they then, unless otherwise-ordiered by the two hiouses,
further adjourn their respective Houses until the 10th of November 1868, at noon, and then, unless otherwise ordered by the twoHouses, further adjourn their respective Houses until the first
Monday of December 1868,at noon.
A letter from the attorney-general, dated 22d September, recognised Mr. O'Neill as'the attorney for the United States in this,
district, and renewed the direction to him to proceed in the dis.
charge of the duties of the office.
On the 24th of September a clerk in the office of the district
attorney handed to the clerk of the court a written order to. issue
process at the suit of the United States, subscribed with the name
of Mr. Gilpin as the district attorney. The clerk cf the court
thereupon consulted the judge, who said that although he doibted
Mr. O'Neill's right, he also doubted whether Mr. Gilpin. was 'a
rightful incumbent; and doubted whether, independently of any
question of right, Mr. Gilpin could any longer be considered as
the incumbent in fact.
The judge added that as there might be temporary publi' incon-
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venience from uncertainty whether the government was regularly
represented in its local court of ordinary criminal and fiscal juris
diction, he"would not refuse to hear, at the request of either Mr.
Gilpin or Mr. O'Neill, with due notice to the other, an argument
upon the right of either of them to a provisional recognition of him
as the incumbent of the office. How far such provisional recognition of either might affect the legal question of incumbency in
fact, the judge said'that he did not know; but he said that certainly such a provisional recognition could not affect the question'
of incumbency qf right. This question of right to the office, he
said, could not be thus decided collaterally and informally.
In consequence of these suggestions of the judge, there was,
at, the instance of Mr. Gilpin's counsel, an argument on 80th
September and 2d October, by
Mr. Brig ly and Mr. George D. Budd, for Mr. Gilpin, and
Mr. Hirst, for Mr. O'Neill.
Opinion by CADWALADER, District Judge, October 8th 1868.
The -Act of Congress of 13th July 1866, prohibits the dismissal of any officer from the military or naval service in time of
peace, except in pursuance or in commutation of the sentence of
a court-martial. The Act of 2d March 1867, known as the
Tenure of -Office Act, applies to civil offices whose tenure is.not
constitutionally defined, and to which appointments cannot be
made, when the Senate. is in session, without the advice and consent of the Senate. In what follows, the general word offices
will be understood as designating such offices. Their tenure is
dufined by the act in such a manner as to prevent the removal of
their incumbents by the President without the Senate's concurrence, and also to prevent vacancies from occurring in a recess
of the Senate, otherwise than by death or by resignation. To
this intent the tenure is in general continued by the act until the
Senate's concurrence in the President's appointment of successors.
Of two exceptions of certain classes of officers from the general
enactments, one which is at the close of the 1st section has of
late been much considered. It does not concern any present
question. The other exception is in the enactment of the 4th section that nothing contained in the act shall be construed to extend
the term of any office the duration of which is limited by law.
A previous Act of Congress had limited the duration of the
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term of the office in question to four years. Mr. Gilpin's term
expired on 15th March last. The office then became vacant, if
the words of the 4th section of the Tenure of Office Act are to be
understood. according to their unqualified literal import. If this
literal construction would, in any great measure, frustrate the
general purposes of the act, any other interpretation comporting with the words and? the motives of legislation; and with the
Constitution, would be preferable. But of the offices under the
government at the date of the act, the* greater number by far
were held for an indefinite period.' The words of the 4th section
may therefore be understood and applied according to their simple
and literal import, without frustrating, in any material degree, the
general purposes of the act.
If another meaning, not so simple but more consistent with any
apparent general motives of legislation, might be attributable to
the words, it;could not be reconciled in every respect, nor for all the
purposes of this'case, with constitutional definitions of the powers
of Congress. The general enactments of the 1st section expressly
apply alike to offices held under appointments prior to the act,
and to those held under subsequent appointments. 'As to the
latter, there is no doubt of the power of Congress to prolong conditionally or provisionally the tenure of an offite like that in question beyond the expiration -of any 'certain term in it formerly
limited by statute. The prolongation might have been absolute,
and there is no reason that it may not be contingent, qualified., or
conditional. In any such case the original appointment of the
future incumbent is for the prolonged period. By future incumbent I'mean of course one appointed after the enactment coliditionally prolonging the tenure. But the present case of a person
who at the time of the enactment was already in office for a
limited term, is different. Congress can, it is true, abrogate
offices established by legislation, and can abri'dge the term or
tenure of an existing office like this. But the Constitution does
not confer any power on Congress to extend an existing term in
such an office in such a manner as to pr6long absolutely or. con.
ditionally the tenure' of a present incumbent. This cannQ, he
done otherwise than by a renomination or new appointinent by
I See the Tabular- Analysis.

548-554.

Report of Impeachment of the President, I.,,

792

CASE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY.

the President, and concurrence of the Senate, as to the additional
period.
If the constitutional power to do this by mere legislation did
not exist, Mr. Gilpin's term or tenure cannot have been enlarged.
I perceived from the first this difficulty in his case, but was not
disFosed to assume that any part of an enactment by Congress
was unconstitutional without hearing an argument of the question.
In arguing it his counsel have relied on the authority given by
the Constitution to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the specified powers of Congress, and all other
powers vested by the Constitution in the government, or in any
of its departments or officers.
If the aid of this power of incidental legislation could be thus
invoked without first establishing .the existence of an appropriate
principal power, indefinite usirpation of authority by the legislativ~e organ of the government would be promoted. Congress has
no power thus indirectly to determine who shall b e the incumbent
of an office. Consequently Mr. Gilpin could not, under any interpretation of the act, be in office.
The existence of this constitutional difficulty may assist in
explaining the intent and purpose of the 4th section of the act.
The difficulty did not indeed apply to future incumbents of offices
whose terms are of limited duration. But without looking outside
of the act itself, we can see that political motives may have indueddl its framers to consider principally the case of present
incumbents; and that if their tenure could not be prolonged, the
distinction as to future incumbents may have been disregarded as
comparatively unimportant. The unqualified exception of all
offices held or to be held for limited terns may thus become
intelligible.
Therefore, whether the constitutional power of Congress, or the
simple meaning of the act, is to be considered, Mr. Gilpin is not
of right in office
Whatever may have been the state of the question of incumoency in fact until 19th September, when he received the attorney-general's letter of the previous day, the effect of this letter
was to terminate the relations on which incumbency, independently of the question of -right,depended. If this were-otherwise
doubtful, it would be necessary to consider essential peculiarities
of the office which require the continuance of a relation of attor.
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ney or counsel to client, If unquestionable right in such'au
office might carry with it a constructive incumbency in fact where
no adverse occupation of the office existed, or if actual occupation
of it continuing under the assertion of a questionable right could
constitute incumbency in fact, it would not follow that there could,
without right, be a merely constructive incumbency in fact.
The questions upon which Mr. O'Neill's right depends are,
1. Whether the President can, during a recess of the Senate,
make a temporary appointment to fill a vacancy in office in a case
in which the Senate has been in session either when or since the
vacancy first occurr!d.
2. Whether there was a recess of the Senate upon the adjournmenf of Congress on 27th July last.
3. Whether the subsequent meeting of the Senate on 21st September, was such a session that their adjournment on the same
day terminat'ed a commission granted in the recess to eipire at
the end of their next session.
In the statement of the first question the phrase temp6rary appointment has been used. There is no such expression in the
provision of the Constitution which confers on .the President
power to fill up vacancies that may happen during the recess of
the Senate. This provision authorizbs him to fill them by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of the Senate's
next session. Such appointments have, nevertheless, ordinarily
been designated as temporary. The expression is borrowed from
the provision of the Constitution, that if vacancies in the Senate
happen, by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the
legislature of a state, the executive of such state may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of her legislature
which shall then fill such vacancies. Here the context, of the
phrase next meeting necessarily imports an extension of time in
order that the vacancies may be duly filled. For this reason, and
in order to harmonize the provision with that empowering the
President to fill vacancies happening during the recess of the
Senate, this phrase next meeting has been uniformly understood
by the Senate, in determining the qualifications of its members,
to be of equivalent import with next session, and to include the
whole session.1 There is thus a very close .analogy between the
I The decision of General -Smith's case, in 1809, to this effect, has been acted
upon ,miformly in a great number of cases.
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two provisions of the Constitution;- and the phrase temporary
appointment may properly be understood as of like import in
each.
The phrase permanent appointment has, by contrast, a meaning which cannot be misunderstood in its application to an appointment by the President, concurred in by the Senate.
The question will first be considered solely upon the effect of
the provision of the Constitution as to 'the power of the President.
Those on the affirmative side contend that the provision must
be understood as enabling him to grant a temporary commission
whenever there may happen to be a vacancy during a recess of
the Senate, whether the Senate was or was not in session when
the vacancy occurred, or has or has not been since in session.
The argument is that the words ".may happen" upon whose effect
the question depends, can be understood as meaning, not happen
to occur, but happen to exist, and that this construction must be
adopted because the opposite one would be less conformable7.to
the reason, spirit and purpose of the Constitution, which, according to.the argument, were only to prevent embarrassments of the
government, and occasional dangers, from the existence of vacancies in office when the Senate might not be in session.
The public inconvenience or danger to public interests, from the
continuance of a vacancy after a session of the Senate, is quite
as great as from the occurrence of a vacancy during a recess. It
is cbntended that the. exigencies of the government *required,
therefore, a like -remedy of the evil in- each case; and examples
.
or quite
have been adduced of cases in which it mfay -be " pearly
impossible" for the President to send in a nomination before the
adjournment of the Senate, or for the Senate to act upon his
nominations though made in season for their action.
There are serious objections to so broad an extension of the
presidential power in question. Such an extension of it, if established, would enable the President to do indirectly, what the
Constitution does not allow him to do directly. His appointments
during recesses of the Senate might be so made and renewed that
they could not properly be called temporary. They might, moreover, be withdrawn from the consideration of the Senate. Thus
he might, though the Senate were in session when the vacancy
first occurred, or had sat since it thus occurred, appoint, in the
recess, an officer who would be objectionable to the Senate if in
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session,-and might, in disregard or defiance of the Senate; con.
tinue him in office indefinitely. This might be done by successive
appointments and re-appointmen'ts of him at the commencement
of every recess until the end of the next ensuing session of the
Senate. There is nothing in the political experience of our
country to warrant her security against such temporary appointmeuts being thus made again and again with such results. The
Senate, where vacancies existed, would thus be unable to oppose
any effectual check to the President's power of appointment. To
avoid the danger of impeachment of a President, the appearance
of defiance of the Senate might be avoided by not making nominations during the session, or abstaining in the recess from the
re-appointment of rejected persons, but substituting other appointees, who, if the Senate were sitting, would be not less objectionable. This would be no visionary danger where the President
and a majoritr of the Senate -are of different political opinions.
If i.had beeh intended to give such an amplitude of power to
the President, his authority to fill vacancies' in office would not
have been limited to those happeningduring a recess, nor limited
to grants of commissions to expire at the end of the Senate's
next session'. He would have beeL. expressly authorized, in every
6ase of a vacancy existing during a recess, to grant commissions
to continue until a new appointment by him with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
The general question has from time to time arisen, as will, be
seen hereafter, in different specific forms. In some of these forms
of it, the words of the Constitution might, without'straining them,
be accommodated to either an affirmative or a negative answer.
But, in other forms of it,.those persons who, in argument, support
the affirmative, must, in candor, admit that their construction is
not confoimable to either the literal or the ordinary import of the
words "may happen." If the purpose of the "Constitution had.
been demonstrable to confer, as the argument assumes, an unquali.
fled'executive power to prevent at all times the continuance of
any vacancies during recesses of the Senate, the latitude of construction contended for might be less objectionable, though there
is always great political danger from enlarged constru6fions of
the Constitution upon such reasons. The danger from them may
be unseen until too late to avoid it. But was the purpose of the
constitutional provision thus unlimited?
-
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According to Judge STORY (Constit. § 1551), the purpose was,
"that the President should be authorized to make temporary
appointments during the recess, which should expire when the
Senate should have had an opvortunity to act on the subject."
According to the construction contended for, it is, on the contrary,
unimportant whether the Senate has had such an opportunity ta
act or not. The purpose attributed by Judge STORY is thus disregarded in the argument on the affirmative side 'of the question.
Before the adoption of the Constitution, opinions. differed, as
-they now may differ in the abstract, whether the President's
power of making appointments to office, ought to be unchecked.
In. the opinion of-some persons, he should have had the whole
power without restraint or qualification. Others were appalled'
with various reasonable apprehensions of enormous and fr ightful
-dangers from uncontrolled power of appointment in a single magistrate. The reasons urged on the latter side prevailed. The
Constitution has, accordingly, opposed in the Senate a barrier
against uncontrolled executive power of the President in this
respect. The constitutional policy having- been established, it
must be carried into effect without the influence of any abstract
prejudice in favor of the opposite political theory.
Fundamental ,opposing reasons of constitutional policy outweigh the argument which has been urged 'in
favor of adopting
the latitudinarian construction. The occasional evils which
might be avoided through such a construction are more or less
inseparable from any system of government of a free people.
Under a complicated political system of mutually counteracting
checks, like the government of the-United States, the continuance
of our freedom could not be maintained without incessant caution
to guard against both executive and legislative encroachments.
Either of them tends towards usurpations of despotic power, and
the tendency may be so gradual as to be almost imperceptible.
The dangers from such encroachments would be more serious than
from the occasional suspension or inefficiency of governmental
functions through temporary vacancies in office.
More serious evils may occur through inaction of the legisla.
tive department of the government. A partial failure of the
necessary annual appropriations by Congress has occurred more
than once ; and, but for the call of an extra session, had once
occurred on a large scale. Such a failure to legislate might sus-
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pend the functions of the government: This, if it occurred, would
not justify the executive in a violation of the constitutional provision that no money shall be paid out of the treasury without a
legislative appropriation. Every extension of executive powers
under any such emergency would, as I have said, be a step
towards despotism; or, as may be added, might establish it at
once. All evils to be apprehended from administrative inefficiency, are minor as compared with inevitable or probable consequences of the extension of legislative or executive power beyond
the strict warrant, of the Constitution.
It has been truly said that the dangers from extension of
executive, may be less*than are to be apprehended from that
of legislative, power, because the President may, hut Congress
cannot, be impeached for wilful abuse of constitutional power,
though its limits be not exceeded. But the suggestion, however
irue, affords -uo.sufficient answer to the objection against latitude
in construing constitutional grants of executive power. If the
general fqrm of the present question were different, if the literal
import of the Constitution were in favor of the extended power,
the argument might indeed be a fair one against excluding a construction which would conform to the import. We have seen
already that if the existence of the power in question were admitted, it might be exercised most injuriously without any liability to impeachment. But the suggestion of the liability to
impeachment may be disposed of on more general grounds. If
such a suggestion were an answer to th6 objection against a-constructive extension of the meaning of the Constitution beyonLd
the ordinary import of its words, the constitutional barriers
against undue expansions of executive power would sobn be burst
asunder."

The Constitution requires the President to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed. It has been truly said that his duty
therefore is to fill vacancies in office wherever the Constitution
confers on him the power to do so. This cannot imply that where
the Constitution does.not expressly authorize him to fill vacancies,
they can be temporarily filled by him under the provisioqi of the
Constitution which requires him to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed. There is no executive power conferred by
the Constitution which it would be more dangerous to enlarge
through a loose construction upon suggested reasons of expe

798

CASE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY.

diency, or of relative necessity. But-this provision of the Constitution has, if I am not mistaken, been sometimes invoked to aid
the constructive enlargement of the provision authorizing him
to fill vacancies that may happen during a recess of the Senate.
This canhot" be a right view of the question. In some cases in
which offices are vacant, the existence of the vacancies may ren
der it impossible for the President to see to the execution of the
laws. In such cases the laws cannot be executed while- the
vacancies continue. In other cases there may be no such impossibility, or the temporary impossibility may not be a total one.
In the latter cases, he may temporarily see, as far as possible, to
the execution of the laws. But he does not thereby temporarily
fill the vacant offices. They continue vacant, though functions'
corresponding more or less to their duties may thus be. executed.
This difference between filling a vacancy in office, and seeing
that the vacancy occasions no failure in the execution of the laws,
might be well exemplified in the present case of the office of attorney of the United States for a judicial district. If the office is
vacant the greater part of its business, if not the whole of it, may
nevertheless be transacted. The gentleman whom the attorneygeneral has employed under the Act of 1861, as an attorney and
counsellor, may represent the United States in their suits and
prosecutions, and may otherwise discharge the duties, in the per.
formance of which he would have assisted the district attorney
if no'vacancy had occurred. Should the existence of a temporary"
vacancy in the principal office be- established, the circuit judge
may, under an Act of 3d March 1863, tem orarily fill the vacancy.
His appointee will, under the Constitution, be an officer of the
court. If neither of these Acts of 1861 and 1863 had been
passed, the President might, through the attorney-general, as
the head of the law department of the government, have retained
an attorney or counsellor, not so permanently as the Act of 1861
authorizes, but for the occasional purposes of the exigency. - Such
a lawyer's temporary representation of the United States in the
legal business of the district would essentially differ from the
temporary incumbency of an office. He would not be an officer
of the United States.
For the reasons which have been stated, my opinion upon the
first question, if considered as an open one, would be that the
President cannot make the temporary appointment in a recess,
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if.the Senate was in session when, or since, the vacancy first
occurred, and consequently that Mr. O'Neill is no more in office
of right, than he would have been if commissioned by the President during a session of the Senate without their advice and
consent.
It is said, however, that the question is not open. I believe
that it has never been judicially considered. But it is said that
the existence of the power in question has been established by an
administrative usage of forty-five years; during which appointments made in exercise of the power by successive Presidents
have been acquiesced in by the Senate, and that this executive
usage has, in this period, been founded on, or supported by, un-,
varying opinions of successive attorney-generals.
Where an executive usage has been of long continuance, with
constantly recurring opportunities for judicial contestation, and
the parties who might have contested have never 'complained,
judicial tribunals may consider a truly doubtful question as to
the constitutionality of the usage less open to forensic dispute
than it would otherwise have been. The effect thus attributable
to such a usage, may, in the absence of judicial contestation, be
greater if legislative acquiescence has been evinced or may be
implied.
Any remaining doubt may be removed, or lessened, if uni
formly concurring opinions of experienced statesmen, and of
learned lawyers, in accordance with such a political usage; can
be traced from an early period, more especially where such period
was contemporaneous,'or almost so, with the adoption of the Constitution. Where all such conditions have been apparently fulfilled, a conclusion should not, however, be judicially reached
upon such grounds alone, without caution.
Have all or any and which of ihese conditions been fulfilled ?
In the outset of this inquiry it may be repeated that if the presidential power in question had been assumed and exercised with
effect, where sufficient opportunities for judicial contestation were
afforded, and no persoii had ever availea himself of any -such
opportunity, the inference of general acquiescence in the constitutionality of the asserted power might have been to some extent
warranted. But there never was any such opportunity of contestation.
Indirect contestation was impossible (see 17 Howard 284),
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and the President's power of removal, would have precluded -Any
direct contestation, if it had otherwise been practicable when the
attorney-general was not a contestant. Until the Acts of 1866
and 1867, which have been mentioned, the power of Congress to
define tenures of office in such a manner as to prevent removals
at the mere will of the President had scarcely ever been exer
cised, though the legislative power to do so as to all offices whose
tenure is not constitutionally defined was never doubtful.
The recently-created office of comptroller of the currency was,
I believe, the only one of which, at the dates of those acts, the
incumbent was not removable by the President without any concurrence of the Senate; and without any statement of reasons'"
The President's general power of arbitrary removal where thetenure had not been otherwise defined by the Constitution or by
Act of Congress, was beyond question established. (See 18
Peters 259.) Of this power the former existence and validity
are not inipliedly questioned by the Acts of 1866 and 1867.
The omission to litigate the question- before the Act of 1867,'
therefore, warrants no just inference of acquiescence in. the
allegea 'administrative usage. Even under this act judicial con.
testation may not readily occur.
In approaching the inquiry whether, and how far, any of the
other conditions have been fulfilled, it may be remarked that from
the distinguished eminence of some of the attorney-generals
whose opinions will be mentioned, judicial deference might almost
be due to their expositions of constitutional law, even where pracThe Acts of 1863 and 1864 made the comptroller of the currency appointable
by the President on the nomination of the secretary of the treasury, and by and
wim the advice and consent of the Senate. The comptroller thus appointed was,
according to the Act of 1863, to hold- the office for a certain term, unless sooner
removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and
according to the Act of 1864, to hold for such term unless sooner removed by the
President upon reasons to be communicated by him to the Senate. Two prior
acts, no longer in force, one of them passed in 1789, organizing the government
of the Northwestern Territory, and the other passed in 1836, organizing the gbvernment of that part of this territory which afterwards became the state of Wisconsin, were intended to execute the provision of the Ordinance of 1787, that the
tenure of judicial offices in the territory should be during good behavior. In
the opinion of many persons, there was an honorary obligation of the constitutional government of the United States thus to execute this provision of the ordinance of the previous confederation. The judicial tenure in other territories of
the United States has not been during good behavior.

CASE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY.

veal concurrence in them has not extended beyond the limits of
executive administration.
This may 'certainly be said of Mr.
Tanev, afterwards the venerated Chief Justice of the Supreme
Cnurt of the United States, and of Mr. Cushing, previously a
judge of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, whose opinions,
,vhile he was attorney-general, are, through the combination of
doctrinal with practical instruction which distinguishes them,
more useful perhaps than the writings of any publicist since
Bvnkershoek.
Of course, I do not 'mean to intimate that
through deference to any such extra-Judicial opinions. I should
surrender the judgment which it is my duty to exercise. But
my judgment cannot be-uninfluenced by the deference most justly
due to them. Except in one respect, however, opinions of attorney-generals are, in themselves, of no more'weight than those of
as many private lawyers of equal abilities and acquirements..
The exception, -which may be an important one, is that the
official opinions of attorney-generals may, for a long time, have
been so uniformly acted upon by executive and legislative organs
of the National Government as to have become the unquestioned
foundation of a system of legislation, or of administration. Such
legislative and executive usages, when uniformly acquiesced in,
ispecially where they have been open to judicial contestation,
are, as I have already said, in themselves, more or less authoritative expositions of the true meaning and effect of the Constitution.
The opinion of a former law officer of the government, when it
has been the foundation of such'expositions, may be an important
part of their legal history, and may therefore be cited in explanation of them, or even as having in itself, for this reason, a dertain weight, perhaps, of authority. But the number of concurring official opinions of attorney-generals on the same point adds
very little to their weight, becafise," in the absence of judicial
decision, these law officers of the government somnetimes attribute
to the opinion of an official predecessor an effect not much unlike
that of an authoritative precedent. In one respect, indeed, the
number of such official opinions may een detract from .their
weight, because, if te same question has been repeatedly stated
anew, and renewals -of the former opinions ,of attorney-generals
upon it have been obtained from their successors, this uiay indicate that no settled administrative usage had been understood to
be established under the former opinions:
VOL. XVI.-51
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In this connection I will state and .explain what induced nie to
refer counsel, in the course of their arguments, to the opinions of
commentators on the Constitution who were either ignorant of
these official opinions of the attorney-generals, or entertained
opinions of a seeming opposite tendency. My purpose was to
show that there had not been such a distinct prevalence of uniform
opinions on the question as the counsel on one side had assumed.
In his argument he. had, as I thought, attributed an inherent
force of authority to the official opinions which they did not possess. My reference to the commentators was intended merely as
a suggestion.that their opinions might be weighed inthe opposing
scale of his own balance. Among them was Judge Story, whose
Commentaries have been cited occasionally, even by the Supreme
Court, as elucidating questions of constitutional law, and Mr.
Sergeant, afterwards a judge of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, who was often followed by Judge Story, and was not
less learned and wise than cautious and accurate. Such references, whether to commentators, however eminent, or to attorneygenerals howeier distinguished, are outside of the ordinary proper line of argument in a judicial tribunal. But they are, when
due caution is observed, not absolutely improper in excepted
cases; and the present case, I think, is one.
The question arose, in 1823, in the same -form in which it is
presented in this case. The official term of a .navy agent at New
York. expired when the Senate was in session. During -the same,
session another person 'Was nominated by the President; but this
appointment was not concurred in by the Senate. The vacancy
continuing to exist in the recess of the Senate, Mr. Wirt, then
Attorney-General, was of opinion that the' President could fill
the vacancy by a temporary appointment. Mr. Wirt thought that
the phrase of the Constitution "happen during the recess" might
be understood as meaning happen to exist in a recess, whether
the Sedate had or had not been in session when or. since the
vacancy first occurred. He supported this opinion upon reasons
of convenience to prevent vacancies in office ; and upon these
reasons considered his interpretation the most accordant with the
spirit and purpose of the Constitution, though the opposite interpretation would, as he conceived, be the most accordant with the
literal sense and natural import of the words.
In the form of the question in which it was next presented to
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an attorney-general, the possible dangerous political consequences
of an affirmative answer were, in part, discernible. This was in
1832. A vacancy had occurred in a recess of the Senate, by
the expiration of the term of office of a register of the land office.
During the same recess, a temporary appointment in his place
bad been made by a commission which was in force until the end
of the next session of the Senate. During this next session, the
person thus appointed had been nominated by the President for
the permanent appointment, and had beeii rejected by the Senate.
During the same session the same person had been nominated
again. The latter nomination had been laid by the Senate on
its table. The Senate had adjourned without having further
acted upon the case. The opinion of the Aitorney-General, Mr.
Taney, was asked by the President upon the question whether,
during the recess of the Senate, he could appoint the same person, or any one else, to the office. Mr. Taney was of opinion
that the President could.
In accommodating this opinion to the letter of the Constitution,
there was less difficulty than in either of the two cases of the
navy agents. The commission granted in the recess did not
expire untif the end of the next session, during which, no appointinent was concurred in by the Senate. The- incumbency had thus
continued until the commencement of the recess. As-there had
not been any vacancy during the session, the new vacancy might,
even according to an almost literal import of the Constitutior, be
understood as occurring, if not happeiing in the recess. But
the difficulty in the Way of accommodating such a construction
to the spirit and purpose of the Constitution was much greater
than in the case which. had been considered by Mr. Wirt. Tbis
difficulty I have explained. How the objection was overcome,
without unduly slighting it, is not easily perceivable. The answer
that the President might be impeached was the only one suggested.
This answer is insufficient for the reasons which have been stated.
The extent of the executive power to fill vacancies which these
two opinions asserted does not appear to" have- been afterwards
conceded. The previous. tendency of Mr. Sergeant's views in an
It may be
opposite direction will be mentioned hereafter.
remarked here that he published a revised edition of his treatise
on constitutional law in 1830, seven years after the opinion of
kr. Wirt, without any adoption of Mr. Wirt's views, and wita
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out any material alteration of his own former text on this p6int.
Judge STORY, in his. Commentaries, published in 1833, a year after
Mr. Taney's opinion, did not cite it, nor that of Mr. Wirt, nor
express any such opinion; but on the contrary followed closely
the text of Mr. Sergeant. In the editions of Chancellor KENT'S
Commentaries prior to 1841, when the opinions of the attorneygenerals first appeared, in print, he quoted the provision of the
•Constitution' authorizing the President to fill vacancies happening
during the recess of the Senate, but did not mention the point
now in'question in any form of the proposition. In subsequent
editions the text is unchanged; but in a note he refers to Mr.
Wirt's opinion without mentioning that of Mr. Taney,-who was
already Chief Justice. The opinion of Mr. Wirt was quoted by
Chancellor KENT; but with a reserve which by no means indicates
his adoption of it.
In 1841 the question was referred anew to the attorney-general,
Mr. Legare, in the broad general form of a proposition whether
the clause of the Constitution authorizing the President to fill up
all vacancies that may happen during the recess of* the Senate,
authorizes him to fill a vacancy so occurring after a session of
the Senate shall have intervened. The attorney-general objected
to considering the question in so abstract a form; and restated
the proposition so as to make it applicable in the case of a vacancy
which had occurred during a recess, and had -been filled by a
temporary appointment, after which, the President, during a
session of the Senate,'had made another nomination which was
not acted upon by the Senate ; and so, the office being vacant in
the ensuing recess, the restated question was whether the President had power to fill it again by granting a commission which
should expire at the end of the next session of the Senate. In
this form of the question the attorney-general answered it affirmatively with reference to the words of the Constitution, and to
considerations of necessity or expediency. It has already been
suggested that in such a special form of the question, the answer
thus given could be.accommodated to the words of the Constitu.
tion.
That these official opinions were not followed without scruple
or hesitation appears from the constant recurrence of the question submitted, as it was, in different forms, to successive attorney.
a
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generals, Mr. Mason in 1846, Mr. Cushing in 1855,' and afterwards to others who concurred in the views of their predecessors.
In October 1862, however, Attorney-General Bates was consulted
by the President as to "his power to fill a vacancy on the bench
of the Supreme Court, then existing in the recess of the Senate,
which vacancy existed during and before the session of the
Senate." Mr. Bates, in his letter of reply, says: "'If the question were new, and now for the first time to be considered, 1
might have serious doubts of your constitutiondlpower to'fill the
vacancy by temporary appointment in the recess of the Senate.
But the question is not new. It is settled in favor of the power
to fill up the vacancy as far at least as a constitutional question
can be settled by the continued practice of your predecessors,
and the reiterated opinions of mine, and sanctioned, so far as I
know or believe, by the unbroken acquiescence of the Senate.
Referring to the practice and to these authorities," he gave his
opinion that the power was exercisable. Conformably to these
views, Judge Davis was temporarily commissioned on 1tth October 1862, during the recess of the Senate.2 I believe that he
did not takd a seat upon the bench of the Supreme Court under
this commission. The next session of that court began on 1st
December 1862. His" permanent appointment was, I believe,
sent into the Senate on 3d December, and: confirmed by the
Senate on or before 8th December 1862, on which day his -permanent commission bears date. He took his seat, as I am informed, on 10th December 1862.'
In considering the effect of the opinions of the official. predecessors of Mr. Bates it becomes important to correct the statement, in his opini6n, that the exercise of the asserted presidentiMl
I The question was not directly involved in the subject of Mir. Cushing's opinion ; but was considered by him incidentally in the course of an inquiry menticned
hereafter as to the President's power to appoint ambassadors and other diploma.ic
ministers.
2 In the argument at the bar, it was erroneously supposed that Judge MILLElt,
of the Supreme Court, had in like manner been commissioned by the President
during aTecess, and Judge FIELD in a manner somewhat similar. Judge MiLLPR
was, however, commissioned on 16th July 1862, when Congiess was iii session.
and Judge FIELD on 10th March 1863, during an extra session bf the Senate.
Each appointment was of course with the advice and consent of the Senate.
s For a reason, which will appear when we come hereafter to consider n Act
of Congress of 9th February 1863, it is not necessary to mention any opinions
of attorney-generals subsequent to that of 'Mr. Bates. '
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power had been "1sanctioned by the unbroken acquiescence of the
Senate." The statement was founded on a mistake. The sup
posed foundation was in the fact, of which the truth may be here
assumed, that in all the cases of permanent reappointment of
temporary appointees which had occurred since 1823, the Senate,
in acting upon the permanent appointments, had not rejected any
one merely because his temporary appointment had been made
after a session in or before which the vacancy had first occurred ;
nor had in anywise discriminated unfavorably to any such appointee for such a reason. It is to lie observed that in such a
case the Senate acts upon the permanent appointment only, and
not upon the previous temporary.appointment. This temporary
appointment cannot possibly,be submitted to them for their advice
and consent. The mistake was in overlooking this impossibility,
and supposing that the Senate's approval of such a person's per-.
manent appointment was a confirmation of his former temporary
one. The Senate's concurrence in any appointment by the President is properly called a confirmation of it, whether the appoinitee" had received a previous temporary appointment or not.
But when the same person who was temporarily appointed in a
recess of the Senate is permanently appointed, at the next session
the permanent appointment only can be confirmed. The word
confirmation is misapplied when the Senate's concurrence in this
appointment is called a confirmation of the former temporary one.
The temporary appointment indeed merges in the permanent one
when the latter is confirmed and accepted. But this neither
makes the permanent appointment itself, nor makes the confirmation of it, a confirmation of the temporary-one. If the Senate
rejects the appointee, or does not act upon his nomination for the
permanent appointment, he nevertheless continues until the end
of the session, to be in office under the former temporary appointment if it was a valid one.
The mistake originated I believe in official or semi-official
language of persons employed in executive departments of the
government, and from thence found its way into popular phraseology, and to some extent into that of legislation. Thus an Act.
of Congress of 1st May 1810, prohibiting the payment of compensation to any chargd des affaires or secretary of legation,
unless appointed by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, authorized him in the recess of the Senate
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to make appointments to such offices which appointments should
be submitted to the Senate at their next session thereafter for
tleir advice and consent. If diplomatic offices only had been
.he subjects of such legislation, it might have been explained for
special reasons of peculiar applicability which will be mentioned
hereafter. But there have been other subjects. The army
appropriation bill of February 1863 prohibits the payment of any
money as salary to any person appointed during a recess of the
Senate to fill a vacancy in any existing office which vacancy
existed when the Senate was in session, and is by law required
to be filled by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
until such appointee shall have been confirmed by the Senate.
And an Act of 3d March 1863 authorized the appointment of
officers of the military signal corps; and, in order to allow time
for a thorough examination of them, enabled the President. to
appoint them. during the recess, requiring, in like manner, that
the appointment should be submitted to the Senate at their next
meeting for their advice and consent. The advice and consent
of. the Senate was in these acts treated as a confirmation of the
previous temporary appointment. Notwithstanding this. mistake,
the acts of course took effect as intended, according to the popular
b'ut legally incorrect meaning of the words. Such a use ofthem by
Congress was not the less a mistake. The like mistake was not
always made in congressional enactments. The Act of 2d March
1799, regulating the collection of duties on imports, sec. 17,'qnd
the Act of 22d July 1813, for the assessment and collection
of direct taxes and internal duties, see. 2, each 6f .which established collection districts or authorized their establishment, and
provided for the appointment of collectors in every district, empowered the President, in case the appointment of the severil
collectors for the respective new- districts should not be made
during the existing session of Congress, to make *them during the
recess of the Senate by granting commissions which should expire
at the end of their next session.'
There have, I believe, been other Acts 'of Congress in which,
as in the two latter en'actments, the mistake was avoided. But it
was not avoided in official parlance; and this may exprain" its
occurrence in the opinion of Attorney-General Bates. If he had
Commissions under the Act of 1813 appear to have been granted by the Piesident until the end of the next session of the Senate, and no longer.

-
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not made the mistake, his own doubts probably would not have
been so readily resolved.
The mistake was corrected by the Supreme Court in 1824, in a
case in which the court below had decided that, in point of law,
both commissions of an appointee, the latter permanent, the
former temporary, " constituted but one continuing appointment,
the second commission operating only as a confirmation of the
first;" and Mr. Wirt, then attorney-general, said in argument,
in the Supreme Court, as to the two commissions, that "the
practice of the government had been. to consider them as one
continuing commission.'" In the opinion of the Supreme Court
"the decision of the court below was founded in mistake." The
Supreme Court said that the two commissions could "not be considered as one continuing appointment without manifest repugnancy," that they were "not only different in date, and given
under different authorities and sureties, but were of different
natures" and durations. It was decided -accordingly that the
responsibility 9f a surety in the official bond of a temporary
appointee terminated on his acceptance of the commission under
his permanent appointment after it had been confirmed: 9
Wheaton 634, 735.
This judicial correction of the mistake is important. The mistake should be viewed in the same light with reference to the
political, practical, and moral, as with reference to the -legal
aspect of the question.. The Senate could not, even before tho
decision of the Supreme Court, much less could they afterwards,
without mere causeless vindictiv-eness, disciiminate in the matter
in question by rejecting persons who had been temporarily
appointed to fill vacancies which had existed when the Senate
was in session. The question of constitutional power was doubtful, or had been so considered. The temporary appointees were
therefore morally blameless. After the decision of the Supreme
Court, acquiescence in the President's assumption of the power
in question could not be reasonably iniplied from the confirmation of an appointment which, according to the decision, was a
new and different one, and was neither a continuation, nor a confirmation, of the questionable one. Thus rejection for this reason
alone would have been wanton, arbitrary, and unjust, and, as
excluding the inference of acquiescence, would have been useless.
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The supposition of acquiescence by the Senate from their not
having rejected the permanent appointees appears therefore to
have been founded in a political as well as a legal mistake.
That it was such a mistake will appear more clearly when the
views in which the Senate has regarded the question are elucidated from positive sources. We may consider, first, decisions
by ihe Senate as to the qualifications of its members, and afterwards, proceedings of the Senate as a co:ordinate branch of the
exec.itive government.
The cases of Mr. Johns, in 1794, and of Mr. Phelps -and Mr.
Williams in 1854, depended upon the effect, of the above-mentioned provision of the' Constitution as to the power of-the executive of a state to fill vacancies in the Senate, happening during
the recess of the legislature. The Senate, in these cases, decided .
that when a vacancy thus occurred in a recess, the governor
could not fill'it during a subsequent recess, the legislature having
sat in the interval,-that where he had properly filled a vacancy
during. the recess in which it occurred, the seat, unless filled by
.the legislature of the state, became vacant at the end of their
next session,--and that although the vacancy afterwards continued, it could. not be filled, by the governor of the state.
The vote excluding Mr. Johns frpm a seat was twenty to seven,
when a full Senate was composed of only thirty members. In
the case of Mr. Phelps the whole subject was- thoroughly considered and the vote was twenty-six to twelve. The case of Mr.
Williams was decided without a divisibn. It was.urged in these
cases with great earnestness, but in vain, that according to the
reason, spirit, and purpose of the Constitution, a state should
not be unrepresented in the Senate, that the evil resuliing from a
vacancy did not depend upon its cause, and that the provision of
the Constitution must have been intended to prevent vacancies by
enabling the governor of a state to fill them temporarily so long
as the legislature might be unable, or might fail, to do so. Such
arguments closely resemble those which haye been urged upon the
present question.

.

It would seem incongruous that the word happen upon whose
application the question depends should not have a similar import
in the two provisions of the Constitution.
We find, accordingly, that a broader, meaning has not beer,
attributed by the Senate, as a co-ordinate branch of the executive,
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to the provision of the Constitution which confers on the President power to fill vacancies in office that may happen during a
recess. The question was first considered by the Senate, acting
in its latter capacity, with reference to the case of an office newly
created by Congress, and not filled before their adjournment.
If the words of the Constitution, "vacancies that may happen
during the recess of the Senate," instead of being referred to
the first occurrence only of a vacancy, are to be understood as
referable to any existence, or continuance of a vacancy, the Constitution gives to the President power, during the recess, to fill
temporarily such newly-created offices. But if the provision of
the- .Constitution applies only to a recess in which the vacancy
first occurs, he cannot thus fill 'them. There is, therefore, in
principle, no difference between this form of the question and
those other specific forms in which we have already considered
it. Acts of Congress purporting to enable the President to fill
such newly,.created offices during the recess, by temporary appointments, have already been mentioned. Such enactments have
an independent effect, as legislative expositions, which will be
considered hereafter, under a distinct head. In the mean time,
it may be remarked here that the effect attributable to them has
been considered by the Senate, in its executive capacity, incidentally to inquiries how far the President may'have an occasional
power to appoint, without the Senate's concurrence, commissioners tb negotiate a treaty with a foreign state. An apparent
digression will be necessary in order to -explain how this inquiry
arose.
Congress may, through the power to regulate the compensation
of diplomatic functionaries, and in some other modes, exercise
indirectly more or less control -over the intercourse of the government of the United -States with foreign governments. But
the President and Senate, if the question of compensation could
be excluded, would under the Constitution have, in their executive capacity, almost unlimited control over such intercourse.
The subject has been fully examined by Attorney-General Cushing, in a very lucid and instructive opinion of 25th May 1855,
upon the effect of the act of that year remodelling the diplomatic
system of the government. In this opinion, in which, in most
respects, I concur, the prior legislation, and prior executive
usages, are historically investigated. The. question, as between
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the President and the Senate, of his power to negotiate primarily,
without their participation, a'treaty, though it cannot afterwards
become binding until ratified by them; is a distinct proposition
which, within certain limits, involves no difficulty. The question
may, within, or beyond such limits, involve an inquiry as to his
independent power to select and send the negotiator. An ambassador,' or other public, minister, whether designated as a
commissioner, or by any other- official title, cannot, except for
purposes of mere occasional exigency, be constitutionally sent
abroad otherwise than under such an appointment as that of any
other officer of the government. But the President primarily
represents the United States in the intercourse of their foreign
relations, including the negotiation of treaties. He is by the
Constitution expressly authorized to receive ambassadors ; and
it has. been supposed that a power inherent in his office imay
enable him to send special diplomatic representatives, abroad
whenever it may be necessary to, do so, for occasional public
exigencies, whether the Senate is in session or not. That even
the occasional exercise of such an inherent or incidental power
was jealously watched appears from the Act of 1st May 1810,
which has been cited. The question of the existence of such a
power, and the present question, are different, arising as they do'
in part, under different provisions of the Gonstitution. But with
reference to the legislation as to newly-created offices, the pr.sent
question was incidentally considered when an occasional dijlo.
matic appointment was made in- a recess of the. Senate. Our
present inquiry is not whether the Senate's views of the question
as to an oncasional diplomatic mission were right -or "wrong.
That is .here unimportant. The inquiry to be elucidated is
whether the Senate, in considering that question, admitted or
denied the power of the President which is now in. question.
Upon this point Mr. Sergeant and Judge STORY have referred
to certain proceedings of the Senate.
In the year 1813, President Madison, during a recess of the
Senate, appointed commissioners to negotiate the treaty of eace
afterwards concluded with Great Britain. Mr. -Sergeant, after
stating that the principle acted up6n in this case was not acquiesced in, but was protested against at the succeeding sessio'n of
I In th.e general sense in which the word is used in the Constitution.
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the Senate, says that, afterwards, in 1822, "during the pendency
of the bill for an appropriation to defray the expenses of missions
to the South America States, it seemed distinctly understood to
be the sense of the Senate, that it is only in offices that become
vacant during the recess that the President is authorized to exercise the right of appointing to office, and that in original vaca'ncies. where there has not been an incumbent of the office, such a
power does not attach to the executive." He also quotes the
coincident report of a committee of the Senate made a few days
later, in which it was declared that in the provision of the Constitution as to vacancies that may happen during the recess of the
Senate, "the word happen has, reference to some casualty not
provided for by law," and that "if the Senate be in session

when offices are created by law, which were not before filled, and
nominations be not then made to them by the President, the President cannot appoint after the adjournment of the Senate,
because in such case the vacancy does not happen during the
recess." It .was added that in many instances, where offices
were created by law, special power was given to the President to
fill them in the recess af the Senate, and that, in no instance,
had the President filled such vacancies without special authority
of law.
Mr. Sergeant and Judge STORY quote these proceedings of the
Senate, and subsequent remarks of the committee of the Senate,.
in such a manner as to. imply that their own opinions coincided.
The proceedings of the Senate were in the year next before
that of M'r. Wirt's opinion. We have sien that in 1824, the
year next after his opinion, the decision of the Supreme Coirt
that the Senate's confirmation of a permanent appointment was
not a continuance of a previous temporary commission of the
appointee, removed any reason which there might previously have
been for formal or informal protests by the Senate in such of the
cases of previous temporary appointment as might involve the
present question.
In 1825, a case occurred which, I think, shows that upon this
ouestion, in its general form, there was a contrariety of opinion
between the President and the Senate.
Tis was the case of Amos Binney, whose commission as navy
agent at Boston expired on 15th February 1825, during the se.ssion of Congress. Three days after, he was nominated to the
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Senate for the same office. The session closed on 3d March 1825,
the Senate adjourning without having acted on the nomination.
The Senate was convened for, and was in.session on, the next
day, 4th March 1825. On the 7th of the same month Mr. Binney was .renominated by the President. Two days later, the
Senate adjourned, having first postponed this nomination tilZ the
corfmencement of their next regillar se'ssion, on the first Monday
of December. During the recess, on 22d March, 1825, Mr. Binney
was temporarily appointed to the office by President John Quincy
Adams, in opposition, as it would seem, to the opinion of the
Senate.
The postponement of-the nomination by the Senate, however it
way -have exceeded their legitimate power, indicated their dissent
from Mr. Wire's then recent opinion. If they supposed that the
President would have the power to make the temporary appoint-'
ment after their session, it does not seem at all probable th~t
they would have passed the resolution to postpone.
Legislative expositions by Congress will next be considered,
not as decisive, in themselves, of any question, but as indicating
concurrence or contrariety of opinion as, to the existence of the
power in question. Acts of 2d March i799, 1st'May 1810, 22d
July 1813, 9th February 1863, and 3d March 1863, have already
been mentioned; How many more such enactments might be
found: upon searching the statute book, I do not know. They
may he numerous. Those which have been cited. are suffiient,
as examples. It should be recollected that they did not all apply
to newly created offices. The Act of 9th February 1863, on the
contrary,.applies to the question in its general form.
These acts import a.discrimination between cases in which the.
Presideiit has, and those in which he has not, the constitutional
power to make temporary appointments, the difference being
between the Senate's having,'or not having, been in session when,
or since, the vacancy first occurred,-the very difference which
the'argument on the affirmative side of the present question supposes to have been., constantly disregarded. If the acts of 1st
May 1810, and 9th February 1863, were the only legislationto
be considered, there might perhaps be dispute whether they should
be understood as affirming the power of the President, and only
checking its undue exercise, or as implyiiig denial or doubt of
the existence of such a power. To the Act of 1810, the former
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motive might, upon reasons already explained as applicable Peculiarly to diplomatic appointments, be imputed less objectionably
than to the Act of 1863. But such a construction even of the
former act, and much more of the latter one, would impute motives
of legislation which perhaps are not properly attributable to Congress, because, if the President had the constitutional power,
Congress had not the power directly to prevent its exercise, and,
in that case, perhaps ought not to have done so indirectly. Upon
the other acts there can be no such dispute. In them, the question whether Congress could vest the power in the President if it
had not been conferred on him by the Constitution, may indeed have
been overlooked.- But, however this may have been, it is quite
certain, that the question of the existence of the President's
power was legislatively considered. The express grant 6f power
by these enactments, implies that, in the.opinion of Congress, the
Constitution had -not given the power to him, or, to say the least,
indicates the constant doubt of Oongres on- the subject. The
counsel has, in argument, cited copiously the debate in the Senate
on. the passage of the enactment of 9th February 1863. The
purposes for which such citations in a judicial tribunal are admissible must be very limited. One of them, under certain cautions,
may, however, be to show on what points, and how, at the date
of a statute, opinions differed as to what was the previous law.
This debate shows that, upon the point of constitutional law now
in question, two Senators, each of whom had been a judge of the,
Supreme Court of his own state, differed in opinion whether the
President had the power under the Constitution.
The question cannot have been overlooked by those who framed
the Tenure of Office Act of 1867. They kiew that constitutional
"doubts could not be resolved by legislation, and that if the presidential power in question existed under the Constitution, legislation could not abridge it, otherwise than by so defining the tenure
of offices as to diminish the frequency of occasions for its exercise. Aware of this, they seem to have discriminated between
different specific forms of the general question, and to have
intended to legislate for those cases only in which ther6 would
have been least difficulty in reconciling the President's assumption of the power with the literal import of the Constitution.
We have seen that the difficulty in this respect was greatest in
cases like the present one of Mr. O'Neill, where the Senate was
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in session when the vacancy first occurred. There is, accordingly, no provision for such cases in the act. In cases in which
vacancies first occur during a recess, the presidential power is,
during the same recess, unquestionable. But in such cases, accordiing to the argument on the affirmative side of the present
question, the temporary appointments of the same or other persons to fill the same vacancies, might be constitutionally repeated
in recurring recesses. We have seen that such repeated temporary appointments, if they had not been'repugnant to the spirit
of the Constitution, might perhaps, without much difficulty, have
been accommodated to its letter. The- d section of the act
seems to have therefore been a legislative endeavor so to define
the tenure as to prevent such repeated appointments, whether
they would, if the tenure had not been so defined, have been constitutional or not. The section was, in short, a legislative effort
to prevent the question, in this form of it, from arising. The
first sentence of the section is a transcript of the constitutional
provision with an insertion of the words b6Sreason of death or
resignation,and an addition of the word thereafter at the close.
The purpose of 'introducing the words "by reason of death or
resignation'" has already been' explained. It wag to .prevent as
inuch as possible the occurrence, during 'ecesses of the Senate,
of any vacancies otherwise than by death or by resignation. The
word thereafter was added in order to preverit the repetition of
the temporary appointments to fill such vacancies. We are .not
at liberty to understand the word as a mere pleonasm. Congress,
in making the addition to the words of the Constitution, cannot
have intended to deal so lightly with its language-. If this word
thereafter is to b e referred grammatically to the nearest antecedent, which is death or resignation,the apparent intent, of Congress to restrain the exercise of -presidential power without the
Senate's concurrence, to the narrowest limit possible, is fulfilled.
If the word thereafter is to be referred, not to this grammatical
antecedent, but to recess of the Senate,,the result must be the
same, because, to effectuate the same appairent legislative intent,
such recess must herb be understood as the recess in which the
vacancy first occurred.."
Now the third section is inapplicable to vacancies which first
occur when the Senate is in session, whether they occur through
death, or through resignation, or otherise. This being so, it
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must be recollected that according to the general argument of th
affirmative .side of the question, if such vacancies continue till
after the session, they become vacancies happening during the
recess. It may be said, and, to a certain extent, correctly, that
if the President has then power to fill them by temporary appointments, it cannot be abridged by Congress. And this, if we stopped
here, might explain the omission to legislate -on the subject. But
it must be recollected further, that, according to the same argument, the President may fill such vacancies again and again, by
temporary commissions on every recurring recess, just as, according to the argument, he may thus repeatedly fill them where the
vacancy first occurred in a recess. The act omits all provision
against such repetitions of temporary appointments, where the
first occurrence of the vacancies was during a session, but provides against them where it was during a recess. According to
the argument the necessity was the same, or equally- great, in
both cases. How is this difference in the legislation to be explained ? The only answer to this inquiry is, that Congress discriminated between cases which, in the opinion of the attorneygenerals, were, in principle, undistinguishable. The 'whole subject
was perhaps thought to be involved in doubt and obscurity, so
much so that perhaps no precisely definable views of the general
question of constitutional law are attributable to Congress.
On the whole question of acquiescence, positive or negative,
we thus find in the present case, a difference in every respect from,
those cases in which points of constitutional law have been established on the foundation of administrative -usage. We might, for
example, contrast the present question with that of the President's
power of removal from office.
To recapitulate, as to the pre sent questioh: There has not been
opportunity for judicial contestation : The existence of the power
in question has not been legislatively recognised,; has been denied
by the Senate, has been practically asserted by Presidents only,
and has not been exercised without constantly recurring suggestions by them of doubts of its existence under the Constitution:
Opinions of attorneys-generals have been its only support ; and
in these opinions, other jurists of eminence have not concurred.
All this might have been said in language more decidedly
showing that the question, whenever directly litigated, will be
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quite open for judicial contestation. At present, I cannot answer
it affirmatively.
2d. The second question is one upon which opinions have, I
believe, differed. It may depend, perhaps, in part, upon congressional usages, of which my knowledge is imperfect. In the
present case, there cannot have been a recess of the Senate unless
thefe was a recess of Congress. On every adjournment of Congress, except such an occasional temporary one as does not suspend the course of business of the-two Houses, the interval until
the next meeting should, I think, be deemed a recess. If so, there
was here a recess on the adjournment of 27th July last.
3d. On the third question I incline to think that if the words,
"unless it be then otherwise ordered by the'two Houses," had not
been contained in the resolution of 22d July, the meeting of the
Senate on' 21st September would have been such a session that
the commissiqn of Mr. O'Neill, if otherwise valid, would have
expired upon the adjournment on the same day. The insertion of
the words which I quote, might not have prevented such a result,
if-anything had been done by the two Hou8es to make the transaction of executive business by.the President and S enate possible,
if the President and Senate had desired it. But the adjournment
excluded all business, and nothing had been done before it to permit the transaction of any business. The Senate could not, however long they might have sat, receive a nomination to office from"
the President; and consequefitly there was, I incline to think,-no
such session that a temporary appointrient, if otherwise valid,
would have been termihated by the adjournment which occurred.
I would have avoided intimating an opinion upon this point, if it
had not seemed Tiecessary, in order to explain my *reason,for
expressing one upon the first queition..
Upon the whole, I am of opinion that Mr. O'Neill is not a
rightful incumbent of the office, and that any legal business
which he may occasionally transact for the Government, under its
law department, or any other department, will not be conaucted
by him as the local law officer. Under the attorney-general's
instructions and authorization of the 18th and'22d, of Sept.mbe4,
I think that the clerk of this court should recognise Mr. O'Neill's
right of directing process to' issue at the suit of the United
States.
I consider the office, upon the question of rightful incumbency,
VOL. XVI-52
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to have been vacant, as I have said, from 15th March. But there
may be a difference between Mr. Gilpin's authority before the
19th of last month, and Mr. O'Neill's present, or occasional future
authority. The existence of such a difference depends upon the
question, whether Mr. Gilpin was, until the latter day, the incum.
bent in fact, though not of right. Mr. O'Neill cannot, through
any future exercise of such authority as he now has, become the
incumbent in fact, .if he is not the incumbent of right. His relations with the officers of the court will be thus understood. His
occasional authority will be recognised as resting on this footing
only, however he may describe it. There will be no implied
acquiescence in .his own definition of its character. Unless the
definition is impliedly concurrent, such acquiescence cannot be
inferred. What I have said will prevent any inference of tacit
acquiescence from acts of the officers.
The word happen imports contingency expires in the ordinary course of events.
total or partial, absolute or qualified. But when it thus expires, the Senate
In Law Rep. 3 C. P. 316, WILLES, J., may or may not be in session. Upon
in view of an absolute contingency, this qualified contingency depends the
said: "An accident is not the same as question whether the vacancy happens
an occurrence, but is something that during arecess. The words of the Conhappens out of the ordinary course of stitution are "may happen," which perthings." In the case of an office whose haps import contingency more strongly
term is of limited duration, the term than if the word may had not been used.

Circuit Court of the United States, .Torthern -Districtof New
York. -In -Equity.
CHARLES H. MEAD, ASSIGNEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF EDWIN
P. RUSSELL, PORTER TREMAIN, AND AUGUSTUS TREMAIN,
v. THE NATIONAL BANK OF FAYETTEVILLE, AND EDWIN P.
RUSSELL, PORTER TREMAIN, AND AUGUSTUS TREMAIN.
A creditor of a partnership firm holding notes both of the firm and of the individual partners for a firm-debt, is entitled to prove in bankruptcy his claims on
the firm-note against the joint estate, and on the individual notes against the scparate estates of the makers.
By -the English practice, such a creditor must elect which estate he will prove
against, but whether such a rule is proper under our Bankrupt Law, dubitatur.

HALL, J.-The defendants, Edwin P. Russell, Porter Tremain
We are indebted for this case to Hon. N. K. HALL.-EDs. Am. L. R.
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and Augustus Tremain, were adjudged bankrupts on the 6th of
January, 1868; and plaintiff was appointed their assignee. These
defendants had been copartners in business, and on the 5th of December,'1866, were indebted to the other defendant (the bank) in
the sum of about $43,000. This indebtedness was evidenced by
sundry notes of the firm, as maker ; and each of these notes of
the-firm bore the indorsement of one of the copartners ;-Porter
Tremain being such indorser for $13,500, Augustus Tremain for
$12,00G, and Edwin P. Russell for $17-500. On the day -last
named, and for reasons not deemed necessaryto be determined
or discussed,-the form of the paper which evidenced such indebtedness was changed upon the application of the officers of the
bank, and the firm notes were taken for $14,000, the notes of
Porter Tremain for $10,000, those of Augustus Tremain for
$9000, and those of Edwin P. Russell- for $10,000. The notes
made by the.firm were indorsed by Edwin P. Russell, and those
made by one 'of the individual partners, were respectively
indorsed by the other two, members of the firm. These notes
were all given for the previously existing copartnership debt, and
they were afterwards renewed by like notes and like indorsements ; all ihe original and renewed notes and indorsements being
in fact securities for debts which wQre the proper debts 'of the
,
copartnership.
After the adjudication in bankruptcy, the bank being then the
holder and owner of the paper thus given in renewal, proved its
debts as against the makers alone; that is against the firm and
joint estate upon the firm note of $14,000, and igainst the individual'members of the firm and. their separate estates, upon-the
notes signed by each partner respectively; but did not prove any
demand against tie separate estates of the copartners upon such
indorsements.
There being assets in the -hands of the plaihtiff belonging to
the joint estate of the bankrupts, as such copartners, and also
assets belonging tQ the separate estates of the* several individual
members of the firm; and the relative hmount of those assets
being such that the tank would receive a much larger dividend,
if allowed to take a dividend upbn its debt or debts" as thus
proved-partly against the -grm and partly against the'partners
individually--the plaintiff, as assignee, filed his bill in this court,
and now insists that the whole debt of the bank, being in equity
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and in fact the debt of the firm, must be proved as a debt against,
and take a dividend from, only the joint estate of the bankrupts ;
and that no part of it can be paid out of the separate or individua.
estates of the bankrupts, in consequence of their individual
liability, either as makers or indorsers.
It is impossible for me, at this time, to give this case the care.
ful examination and deliberate consideration its importance
deserves, without neglecting other cases having equal claims to
an early decision. The counsel who argued the case had,.as they
said, been unable to find any decision under the Act of 1841
which determined this question; and my own limited research
has brought under-my observation but a single case (1?arnum's,
post) in which this question appears to have been decided. In
respect to the firm, whatever may have been the legal relations
between the bank and- the individual partners (see Babcock's Cage,
3 Story's Rep. 393, 398, and 399), these individual partners, in
respect to the notes made or indorsed by them in their individual
names, were accommodation makers or indorsers for the benefit
of the firm; and the firm, as between the partners and in equity,
must be considered as the principal and primary debtor.
As between the bank and these individual partners, the making
or indorsing of these notes created a legal obligation against the
individual partner who thus made or indorsed those notes,.and
the bank might sue upon and enforce such obligation according
to iti form and terms.. I't therefore had its election to sue either
the maker or the indorser; and it might, if it chose, have main.
tained separate suits against the maker and each indorser, and
taken a judgment against each. In short, the bank, when these
notes were dishonored, was the legal creditor of the several parties thereto, according to the form of their several and respective
obligations ; and there is no reason for holding that the legal
relation of debtor and creditor thus subsisting did not exist under
the Bankrupt Act: Babcock's Case, ubi supra.
The 'Act of 1867, § 86, contains, in reference to bankrupt
partners, the same provisions in substance as the Act of 1841,
§ 14; and these provisions have been said to be in accordance
with the rule as previously established. (See Marwick's Case,
before Judge WARE, Day. 229; Collins & Son v. Hood, 4
McLean's Reports 186, 188; Ingall's Case, 5 Boston Law
Reporter 401.)
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These provisions of our statute do not, in terms, prohibit the
bank, which had taken the precaution to require the note of the
copartnership to be indorsed by the members of that copartnership in their individual names, before giving credit upon it, from
proving their debts and taking dividends against the joint and
separate estates of these debtors, in virtue of their joint and
sevdral liabilities respectively ; for the bank was clearly a legal
creditor of the individual partners in respect to the notes uponi
which their individual names appeared, either as makers or in,dorsers; but the English Court of Chancery (in the absence, it
is said, of any statutory provision on the subject) has, it seems,
established the doctrine that in cases of bankruptcy a.creditor
having knowingly taken both, the copartnership and individual
obligation of his debtors for the same debt, must elect whether
he will prove his debt against the join't estate or the separate
estate of his, debtors :. Collyer on -Partnership, &§ 940-948;
Avery. & Hobbs's Bankrupt Law 308 ; Lindley's Law of Partnership (Phila. Law Library), pp. 1013-1025.
This doctrine of election necessarily concedes that the creditor
is a creditor of the firm, and likewise of the separate partners

whose individual liability he has taken the precaution to exact;
and is therefore an authority sustaining the claim of the bank in
this case, that they are the -creditors of the individual partners
upon the notes signed or indorsed by them individually.
The reasonable doctrine that the mere form of the security or
evidence of indebtedness does not control in respeot to the ques.
tion whether the debt' can be proved against the copartnership,
or must be proved against the separate estate of a partneri seefas
also to be well established in England. ' See cases referred to by
Avery & "Hobbs, pp. 809, 310, 311. See also Agawam Bank v.
Morris, 4 Cush. 99.
Thus, when a firm borrowed money for partnership purposes,
and only one of the partners gave a bond for its payment, the
othei being a witness to it and the money being entered on the

cash-book of the firm, it was held that the debt therefor might be
proved as a joint debt: .EnparteBrown, 1 Atkins 225; ... aree
.Thnly, 1 Rose 61.
In this case it is probable that the bank at its election would
have a right to prove its whole debt against the copartnership
estate only, if the rules established by the English Court of
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Chancery were adopted ; but it is not necessary now to decide
whether the bank has such right to prove against the joint estate,
or whether it has a right to prove against the firm upon the firmnote, and against the indorsers thereon,-and against the general
makers and indorsers of the note not signed in the firm-name,according to the legal liability of each,-for the bank has not,
as yet, insisted upon a right to prove its debts except as against
the makers of the s veral notes which evidence the indebtedness.
Looking to the questions actually presented in this case, I am
of the opinion that the bank had a right to prove its debts against
the makers of the notes held by it, and is entitled to dividends
from the joint and separate estates of the bankrupts, according to
such proof. The utmost that can be claimed against the bank is,
that it may be driven to its election; and as it has proved its
debts against the makers of the notes, and them alone, no valid
objection has been urged against such proof.
It may perhaps be doubtful, whether .the bank is compelled -to
elect according to the English practice in bankruptcy. In the
case of Farnum, 6 Boston Law Rep. 21, already referred to, the
learned judge of the Massachusetts district held, that under the
Bankrupt Act of 1841, a creditor who presented a bill of exchange
drawn by the firm and indorsed by one of the partners, was entitled'to a dividend from the joint estate of the' firm, and also a
dividend from the separate estate of the partner who made such
indorsement; and he repudiated the English rule which required
an election by the creditor under like circumstances. The ques.
tion seems to have been carefully considerid by Judge SPRAGUE,
and I confess I regard the rule adopted as -more reasonable than
that of the English courts ; buat if I did not, I should be unwilling
to disregard a decision, directly in point, made by that able judge,
without very careful and deliberate consideration. The English
rule has been disapproved by some of the most eminent judges
and ablest lawyers of England; and Judge SPRAGUE, in the case
alluded to, declared that the right of a party holding two valid
obligations, to the benefit of both, was founded both in law and
justice ; and that be did not think himself authorized to set aside
that right on account of an arbitrary rule, justly reprobated by the
most eminent judges and jurists in England, and never recognised
in this country. This English rule was condemned by Judge
STORY, in Story on Part., § 376, et seg.; and in Borden v.
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Oty/er, 10 Oush. Rep. 478. Judge CUSHING, in delivering the
opinion of the court, declared that it remained a mooted question
in the United States,'and that inMassachusetts the practice and
the weight of professional opinion favored the double proof, but
that the point had not then been adjudicated. Nor. was it adjudicated in that case, or in any other case in our own courts that has
fallen under my observation, except in the case of Farnum
already noticed ; and upon the authority of Judge SPRAGUE'S
decision, and the best consideration I have been able to give to
the question presented, I am of the opinion that the bank hd, at
least, a right to prove its debts and claim dividends in the manner
stated in the bill.
It is not, perhaps, necessary now to consider whether -the oreditors of the individual partners, or rather- the assignee as the
representative, is not in equity entitled to require that the joint
estate shall be deemed a debtor to the assignee as such representative, to the, extent of any payments which may be made upon
the debt of the bank out of the separate estates of the individual
partners, in the same manner that any other party who had made
or indorsed similar notes for the accommodation of the firm might
have done ; and that whether the English doctrine of election is
dr is not to prevail. The bill statbs that- the assets of the firm,
though nominally, amounting to about $50,000, are really worthmuch less; that the individual assets, of the -partners over and
above encumbrances are about as follows :- ussell's $7000;
"PorterTremain's $11,000; and Augustus Tremain s about $3000.
The amount of the debts (other than those of th bank) proved
against the firm and against the several individual pariners is n6t
stated ; bui the firm was insolvent and bankrupt. It is alleged
that Russell ind iidually owed debts amounting to about $900,
while the two other partners owed-no individual debts likely to be
proved, against individual estates*; but I see no'statement rf the
firm or individual debts proved, either in the bill or in the testimony in the case, other than the debts held and proved by the
bank.
At all events the qci estion just suggested has not been argue l,
and a final disposition of it might require a settlement of the
accounts of the individual partners with the firm; 'and as the
case decided by Judge SPRAGUE, and the intimation made in the
10th Cushing had not been called to the "attention of the. counsel
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and were not discussed by them, I think it better not to make 'any
decree in this case at present, but to advise the counsel that in
my opinion the bank has a right 'to dividends against the joint
and separate estates of the bankrupts, according to their proofs
in the case as heretofore stated ; and. that any other question in
the case may be further argued.
Further research by the counsel or myself bnay lead to the discovery of other cases., decided under the Act of 1841, bearing
upon the main question; but I am not able at this time to pursue
the investigation.

Uited States District Court. Districtof New ferseyl.
IN. RE WARREN C. ABBE.
Where a member of a late copartnership files his individual petition under the
Bankrupt Act, and inserts in his schedules debts contrzfcted by said copartnership,
and there are no copartnership assets to be adminiftered, he will be entitled to be
discharged from all his debts, individual as well as copartnership.
It -is iiot necessary, in such a case, to make the other partners parties to the
proceedings, or to have them brought in under General Order No. 18.
The cases of William H. Little, Baukrupt Register 74, And of Alexander 1kear,
Id. 201, commented upon.

Tnn following case and opinion were certified by the Register,
W. S. JOHNSO.

The bankrupt first petitions, using the form prescribed for
partnership petitions (Form 2). In this petition he sets himself. out as a member of "a copartnership lately composed of
himself and one Henry 0. Read, of Philadelphia." The petition
then proceeds in the usual form for partners, alleging inability to
pay debts, &c., and closes by praying that the said firm may be
declared bankrupts, &c. It also contains the allegation that Abbe
has been unable to get his "late copartner, Henry 0. Read, to
join in this petition." The petition is signed and sworn to by
Warren C. Abbe alone. To this petition is attached a schedule
showing debts to the amount of $2456, all of which are stated to
have been "contracted as copartner with Henry C. Read, of the
late firm of Read & Abbe." The schedules show that there are
no partnership assets. Then follows an individual petition (Form
- We are indebted for this case to the Bankrupt Register.-Ens. Am. L. R.
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1), with schedules of individua debts and assets. These dis,-lose but one individual debt, and that small in amount, and n(
individual assets, except such as are exempt from the operation
.
of the ac
The papers, altogether, then form substantially a petition:1st. To have the late firm of Read & Abbe declared bankrupt.
2d. To have Warren 0. Abbe declared bankrupt.
3d. To have Warren C. Abbe decreed (upon full surrender,
&G.) a certificate of discharge from all his debts, both individu
ally, and as a member, of the former firm of Read & Abbe.
On the case coming to me on order of reference, I doubted my
power to make such adjudication as is prayed for by the papers,
und also as to whether I should certify the papers to be "-correct
in form."
The practice in my district has hitherto invariably been for
one who was. formerly a member of a copartnership to file an
individual petition (Form 1), and annex thereto a schedul6 of his
debts, both individual and copartnership, stating opposite each
.debt in its appropriate place ir the schedules, "whether con.
tracted as copartner, &c., or not." Under this practice, a large
number who :owed joint and separate debts have.-been granted
certificates of discharge ; and the practice was accepted without
question as the correct one, until the decision of Judge BLATCHFORD, in the co of Zittle, bankrupt (see. Weekly Bankrupt
Register 74), was announced. In this decision 'the ground .was
taken, that before partnership debts could be discharged, it was
necessary to have the firm declared bankrupt, and that this could
only be done by each partner joining voluntarily, or.by being
brought inby notice, under General Order No. 18. Since that
decision, I understand the practice in that district to have been
modified so as to conform to it, but I am not aware of any other
district in which it has been followed in practice:
Aware of this decision, and wishing to have the matter
dlefinitely settled, the attorney for the bankrupt in this case drew
the papers in the form indicated, that this question might be
raised and disposed bf in this district. It is within my knowledge that there are a nufiiber of cases undisposed of in thisndistrict, in which the question as to the effect of a discharge upon
an individual petition, upon partnership debts, becomes of great
wsprtance.
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I do not think I have the power to declare the firm of Reaa &
Abbe bankrupts. The papers show that the firm was dissolved
before the filing of the petition by Abbe. No act of bankruptcy
is a-eged or proved against Read. The petition is signed by
Abbe alone. Read has not joined in it, and it is alleged his consent cannot be obtained. He has had no notice of these proceedings. An order might be granted to give such notice to Read,
and ordering him, were sufficient acts alleged,. to show cause why
the firm should not be declared bankrupts, but I do not think it
necessary. The only object of Abbe ill asking that the firm be
declared bankrupts, is alleged to be, that the partnership debts
may, be discharged. as to him. He does not care whether Read
is discharged from them or not. All he seeks is, that his own
discharge, if obtained,, may discharge all the debts, both joint
and separate, for which he is now liable. This, I think, would
be the effect of a discharge obtained upon his petition, without
any reference to Read. My opinion is, if the present papers are
regarded as a petition of Abbe's alone, and I adjudicate him
bankrupt, and hot the firm, that his discharge would cover all
debts, both joint and separate. I have therefore refused to grant
the first prayer of the papers, and have held that it was not
necessary to take any steps as to Read.
It is true that Judge BLATCHORD'S dedision, cited above,
holds, or seems to hold, differently ; but, with all deference to
his hbnor's learning and ability, I am inclined to doubt its
correctness.
It must be evident that if, in order for one partner to rid himself of partnership debts, it is necessary for him to bring in ail
the other partners, a large number of partnership debts must
remain undischarged. In many cases it would be impossible to
find the other partners, or if found to procure their assent, or to
prove acts of bankruptcy sufficient to sustain apetitionas against
them.
I think it also evident from the working of the act, that such
was not the intention of Congress. Section 88 expressly provides that "no discharge granted under this act shall release,
discharge, or affect any person liable for the same debt for or
with the bankrupt,, either as partner, joint-contractor, indorser.
surety, or otherwise," implying that one partner may be discharged from joint debts, though the other is not.
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Neither does it seem that the act was so construed by the
judges of the United States Supreme Court, who framed the
General. Orders in Bankruptcy, and the forms of proceeding under
the act.
Among the particulars they require to be stated with regard to
each debt in schedule A 3, is "whether contracted as copartner,
or joint contractor, withi any other person, and, if so, with whom,"
implying that partnership and individual debts may be set out in
'the same schedule attached to the same petition, the value of each
debt being specified.
''It was early settled in England that a certificate upon a separate commission discharged both joint and separate debts: see
ffors'ey's Oase, 3 P. Wins. 23. I have not'been able to find any
decision reversing this early settlement of the law, but there are.
several confirming it: see Eden on Bankruptcy 396; Oweni on
Bankruptcy 291; Tucker v. Axley, 5 Cranch 37; 2.Abbott's
N. Y.-Dig. 479.
But. since this case was filed another case has arisen in the
.Sbuthern District of New York: see In re Alexander lFrear,
Weekly Bankrupt Register 201 ; in which Mr. Register FITCH
4iscusses substantially the same.questions and arrives at the same
conclusions'I have, which conclusions seem to be- approved, or at

least not dissented from, by Judge BLA TCHFORD.
I am of the opinion, therefore, 1st, That I have no power to.
adjudicate the firm of Read & Abbe bankrupts.
2d. That it is unnecessary to -allow the papers.to be amended
or affidavits filed on which to issue an order to bring -Read in,on
notice under General Order No. 18.
3d. That Warren C.- Abbe should be adjudicated a bankrupt,
that creditors, both partnership atid individual, may prove their
debts under such proceedings, and that his discharge will be a bar
to partnership as well as individual debts.
If the court should hold these opinions correct, I will, therefore, regard the papers simply as the petition of Warren G. Abbe
to be discharged from. all his debts, both joint and separate; and
proceed in all respects the same as has hitherto been. done in
other cases.
All which is respectfully certified to thd honorable court for its
opinion thereon.
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concur with the Register in the opinion that
FIELD, J.-I
where a member of a late copartnership files his individual petition, under the Bankrupt Act, and inserts in his schedules debts
contracted by said copartnership, and there are no partnership
assets to be administered, he will be entitled to be discharged
from all his debts, individual as well as copartnership, and that
it is not necessary to make the other partners parties to the
proceedings, or to have them brought in under. General Order
No. 1.
I have examined the two cases referred to before Judge BLATCHFORD, and I am not sure that there is any conflict between them.
In the case of William -ff. Little, a bankrupt (Bankrupt Register 74), the petition was filed by a member of an existing partnership, the schedule of debts showed that a large portion of the
debts were copartnership debts, and the inventory of assets showed
that part of the assets was copartnership property. The judge.
therefore, considered the petition as, in fact, a petition to have
the firm declared bankrupt on the petition of one of its partners.
The application was to amend the petition by joining Dana, the
other partner, with him in the proceedings ; and the court, very
properly, allowed the amendment to be made. It is true in giving his opinion the judge said, that until the other partner,
Dana, was brought in, Little could not be discharged from the
debts of the firm, because the theory and intent of section 36 of
the act and of General Orders Nos. 16 and 18 are, that the creditors of a firm should be required to meet but once, and that all
questions in regard to the bankruptcy of the firm, and the administration of the assets of the firm, were to be determined in one
bankruptcy forum. Now it is very evident that this reasoning
would not apply to a case where the inveiitory did not include
any assets of the firm, and where there were no assets of the firm
to be administered.
In the other case referred to, that of Alexander .rear, Bankrupt Register 201,. the petitioner filed his individual petition,
praying that he might be discharged from all his debts provable
under the Bankrupt Act. The schedules annexed to the petition
showed that the petitioner was also a member of a late copartnership which was diss6lved some time before the filing of the
petition, and that a large number of the debts were copartnership
debts. The questi6n before the Register was, whether a copart

